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Abstract-- This paper presents initial results of a task to identify 
accident initiating events for inertial fusion energy (IFE) power 
plant designs.  Initiating events (IEs) are a fundamental building 
block of a probabilistic risk assessment; they are the ‘accident 
starters’ that are analyzed to determine the risks posed to 
members of the public in the vicinity of the power plant.  The IE 
results for the SOMBRERO design are presented in tabular 
form.  The SOMBRERO design was analyzed since it is 
representative of dry chamber wall, laser driven designs.  This 
work is used to characterize IFE plant risk and to identify 
potential design changes that would mitigate the plant risk.
I. INTRODUCTION 
nitiating events (IEs) are a fundamental building block of a 
probabilistic risk assessment; they are the ‘accident starters’ 
which are analyzed to determine the risks posed to members of 
the public in the vicinity of the power plant.  Completeness in 
IE identification is essential to determining a risk profile for a 
facility.  Therefore, a combination of techniques was used for 
this analysis to ensure completeness [1].  These techniques 
included a Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA) to identify 
energy sources and hazards, a review of historical safety 
reports on IFE plant designs, and a review of Department of 
Energy (DOE) occurrence reports from existing laser and ion 
beam experiments.  A Master Logic Diagram (MLD) for the 
SOMBRERO KrF laser fusion plant design was also 
constructed and analyzed to identify IEs.  MLD construction 
for an ion beam fusion plant (the HYLIFE-II design) is in 
progress and will be published separately [2].  The MLD was 
used to identify the IEs that could result in an off-site release 
of hazardous toxicological or radiological material.  The initial 
IE results for the SOMBRERO design concept are presented in 
tabular form.   
II. INITIATOR IDENTIFICATION
 Several techniques were used for this IE analysis.  The 
PHA, review of safety reports and operational occurrences, 
and MLD have been used in this work to ensure completeness 
for the given design detail.  These techniques are described 
below.    
A. Preliminary Hazards Analysis 
 This is a qualitative analysis technique to address the energy 
sources, hazardous materials, and radioactivity used or stored 
in a facility.  The PHA is best used on facilities in conceptual 
design or on those operational facilities that have not had an 
accident analysis performed.  The PHA for a generic IFE 
power plant concentrated on radioactive, toxic, flammable, and 
explosive material releases; tritium fuel releases; and 
uncontrolled electrical energy releases.  
B. Historical data evaluation 
 Past safety reports and safety sections of inertial fusion 
power plant design studies were reviewed to compile lists of 
IEs.  The past reports on design studies such as Prometheus, 
HIBALL, Osiris, SOMBRERO, HYLIFE-II, and LIBRA did 
not focus on risk assessment or IEs, but rather on the safety 
analysis approach of consequences from large-scale, 
hypothetical release events.  Two worst-case events were cited 
in the safety work for IFE designs; these events were typically 
large loss of coolant accidents that also breach containment, 
and total releases of mobilizable tritium fuel.   
 The National Ignition Facility safety analysis report was 
reviewed [3].  Off-site consequence events applicable to fusion 
power plant designs were tritium releases and natural 
phenomena (high winds, site floods, earthquakes, and a light 
aircraft crash scenario).  The Tritium Systems Test Assembly 
safety analysis report [4] was also reviewed for insights into 
tritium handling IEs.  These IEs included: rupture or large leak 
of tritium from experiment confinement with secondary 
confinement failure (release with and without subsequent fire); 
rupture of a cryopump with loss of secondary confinement 
(with and without subsequent fire); rupture of cryogenic 
distillation columns to the vacuum jacket with jacket breach 
(with and without subsequent fire); and tritium transfer line 
leakage with and without secondary confinement failure (with 
and without subsequent fire). 
 The DOE occurrence report database was searched for 
historical events from laser and ion beam fusion experiments.  
The results were two crane load drop events (a cathode tip and 
a laser lens), three personnel contamination events, a personnel 
electrical shock event, two facility power outages (one for 4.7 
hours, the other for 0.3 hours), three optics damage or optics 
failure events, a 13.8 kV power supply electrical arcing event, 
and one HCl toxic gas leakage event.  These events were 
surprisingly relevant for this IE study.  Crane load drops must 
be considered even if a power plant operates with much fewer 
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modifications or equipment replacements than experiments.  
Power plant equipment will be more massive than experiment 
equipment since power plant equipment handles higher 
throughputs, higher energy densities, etc.  Electrical power 
outages are not rare events and must be accounted for in a risk 
assessment.  Optics damage events must be examined for 
public safety issues since the beam line could be a pathway for 
fuel debris and activated dust to escape confinement.  The 
electrical arc event cannot be entirely precluded by future 
design since equipment can wear, insulation can fail, etc.  The 
electrical arc may not pose a hazard to the public because of 
the use of exclusion areas around outdoor equipment, the 
facility perimeter fence and switchyard fence, and the building 
confinement for indoor equipment.  Toxic gas leaks must be 
analyzed for their consequences to the public and workers. 
C. Master Logic Diagram 
 The MLD is a top down approach of postulating an off-site 
release of hazardous material and then determining what 
failures must occur to result in such a release.  A preliminary 
MLD for the SOMBRERO plant conceptual design [5] was 
completed and analyzed for its initiating events.     
 The MLD is built in successive levels, starting at the top of 
a tree structure.  The first horizontal level is the public hazard, 
defined as an off-site release of hazardous material.  The next 
level is specification of the release pathway, typically the 
building where a release originates.  The third level is the 
release origin, the system that confines radioactive or 
hazardous material.  Level three is necessary to account for the 
many systems in a fusion plant that contain radioactive 
materials and to allow introduction of the concept of 
mobilization of radioactive species.  The fourth level lists the 
release species.  This level was specified because of the 
combined nature of the inventories in the reactor chamber and 
in waste handling and because there can be temperature and 
oxidation/volatilization restrictions on mobilization and 
release of some species.  These restrictions need to be 
delineated for source term assessment.  Level five identifies 
the barriers to release, generally mobilization and the 
engineered physical barriers.  Some of the inventories in the 
IFE reactor are readily mobile (gases and liquids), but some 
are bound in the solid structure and require significant heating 
and the presence of oxygen to be mobilized by volatilization.   
 Level six identifies the safety functions for that branch of 
the diagram.  The safety functions are those acts or functions 
that must be carried out to prevent off-site releases.  Suggested 
safety functions for IFE power plants, based on magnetic 
fusion experience [6], are listed below: 
1. Reduce inventories 
2. Provide confinement barriers 
3. Ensure decay heat removal 
4. Control hydrogen inventories and chemical reactions 
5. Control effects of magnetic energy 
6. Control effects of coolant energy 
7. Monitor status of safety functions and safety related 
  parameters 
8. Provide support services to ensure safety functions 
These safety functions are not listed in order of importance; 
they are equally important.  For the IFE MLD, only the safety 
functions 2 through 6 are included since these deal directly 
with the plant process and safety systems.  Safety function 1 is 
viewed as an engineering control in the design process.  While 
safety functions 7 and 8 are important for maintaining plant 
control, they are not necessary for identifying initiating events 
in an MLD.  That is, loss of monitoring or support services 
does not directly lead to a radiological or toxicological release; 
their loss typically leads to an orderly plant shutdown.  Not all 
safety functions were used in each branch of the MLD since 
some functions do not apply to particular branches.   
 The final level of the MLD identifies events that can fail 
the safety functions.  These events were labeled "failure 
events".  These events can be IEs for the conceptual power 
plant.  If an AND gate was used in the tree, then the failure 
events must be compounded to yield an initiator.  The most 
important failure events are those found on each input to an 
AND gate.  A representative portion of the MLD is shown in 
Fig. 1.  The complete MLD is given in [2].   
D. Compiled IE list 
The initial list of IEs for the SOMBRERO plant design that 
have been identified from these various analysis methods is 
given in Table 1.  Further analysis is needed to determine 
which of these events are significant, and which events can be 
grouped together into event categories.    
III. CONCLUSIONS
 This task has produced a preliminary list of accident 
initiating events for the SOMBRERO dry wall, KrF laser 
driven IFE power plant design.  This preliminary list of IEs 
supports safety assessment and creates a basic framework of 
IEs to consider in future risk characterization of new plant 
designs.  Any IEs that yield unacceptably high consequences 
can be examined to identify potential design changes that 
would limit consequences.   
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Figure 1.  The preliminary Master Logic Diagram for the SOMBRERO design, showing one branch expanded to level 7. 
Table 1.  Preliminary List of Accident Initiating Events for the SOMBRERO IFE Power Plant Design 
plant events
xLoss of chamber wall / shield coolant            xLoss of chamber wall / shield coolant flow 
xLoss of chamber afterheat removal coolant         xLoss of chamber afterheat removal coolant flow 
xLoss of chamber wall / shield coolant heat sink       xLoss of tritium purge from shield Li2O coolant  
xLoss of confinement building integrity           xLoss of KrF lasing gas 
xDriver reactions with IFE chamber walls           xDT fuel gas explosion  
  (laser beams strike or are reflected to walls) 
xLoss of off-site power                 xFacility blackout event 
xLoss of tritium confinement (from pellet injection, from debris cleanup, from storage, or from target fabrication) 
xLarge loss of cryogen                 xRadwaste system release 
natural phenomena and other events of concern
xFire within facility (air atmosphere rooms)         xFire outside of facility (e.g., forest fire, range fire) 
xFlood within facility (coolant or other fluid release)      xSite flood (e.g., from river, high rainfall, runoff) 
xHigh straight winds                  xTornado (or hurricane, seiche) 
xSnow or ice accumulation                xLightning strike 
xAircraft impact                    xOn-site truck accident 
xIn-plant vehicle accident (forklift, etc.)           xBarge or ship accident (if sited near a body of water) 
xOn-site train accident                 xTritium transport accident 
xExternally-generated missiles (turbine blade, hail, etc.)    xCrane load drop 
xMajor accident in close proximity to facility: 
 chemical process plant event, fossil fueled power plant event, industrial or manufacturing plant event, military base event, 
 nuclear fission power plant event, pipeline leak or rupture, rail car derailment event, highway truck accident event 
